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In a 2015 case, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs could bring disparate
impact claims under the Fair Housing Act (the "FHA"). In the majority
opinion, Justice Kennedy relied heavily on the text and supporting case law
interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII") and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (the "ADEA '). Without explicitly
recognizing the powerful new idea he was advocating, Justice Kennedy's
majority opmwn
radically reconceptualized federal
employment
discrimination jurisprudence. This new reading of Title VII and the ADEA
changes both the theoretical framing of the discrimination statutes and greatly
expands their scope.
Title VII and the ADEA have two main operative provisions. For the most
part, courts have framed intentional discrimination claims through the first
provision. Justice Kennedy instead views both the first and second provisions
as relating to intentional discrimination. This Article is the first to explore the
far-reaching implications of this new interpretation. More than fifty years after
the passage of Title VII, it is as if we have found a completely new statutory
provision. This Article shows how viewing the second provision as one that
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concerns intentional discrimination requires wholesale changes in the way that
courts frame discrimination cases.
INTRODUCTION

In 2015, in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc., 1 the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs could bring
disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act (the "FHA"). 2 In the
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy relied heavily on the text and supporting
case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the "ADEA'').3
Without explicitly recognizing the powerful new idea he was advocating,
Justice Kennedy radically reconceptualized federal employment discrimination
jurisprudence.
This new reading of Title VII and the ADEA changes both the theoretical
framing of the discrimination statutes and greatly expands their scope. But
perhaps even more surprising is Justice Thomas's dissent in the same case,
which also supports, at least in part, a broader interpretation of the
discrimination laws' reach. 4 This Article explains why Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion and even Justice Thomas's dissent have the power to
restructure federal employment discrimination law.
Two powerful concepts shape modern discrimination doctrine. The first idea
is that discrimination claims are divided into roughly two kinds of claims:
disparate treatment or disparate impact. 5 The second idea is the adverse action
doctrine. 6 Courts use the adverse action doctrine to impose significant limits on
the kinds of employer actions they are willing to call discrimination. 7 Justice
Kennedy's opinion has the potential to fundamentally alter the way courts
think about the adverse action doctrine and the dichotomy between disparate
impact and disparate treatment claims.
The perceived dichotomy between disparate impact and disparate treatment
cases is one of the foundational structures of federal discrimination claims. As
currently constructed, these claims have different animating theories and proof
frameworks. Disparate treatment claims require an employee to show that
intentional discrimination played a role in an employment outcome. 8 Disparate

135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
Id. at 2525.
3 Id. at 2516-21. It is unclear whether this discussion is dicta. Justice Kennedy does not
explicitly recognize that his reading of Title VII and the ADEA is different from
traditionally articulated ways of reading them.
4 Id. at 2526 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
5 See infra Part I.
6 See infra Part II.
7
See infra Part II.
8
See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
I

2

2016]

JUSTICE KENNEDY'S BIG NEW IDEA

1791

impact does not require the employee to establish intent, but instead allows an
employee to prove discrimination by demonstrating the statistically disparate
effect of seemingly neutral tests and policies. 9
In the popular telling, these concepts also arise from different textual
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Disparate treatment claims
derive from 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Disparate impact claims derive from
§ 2000e-2(a)(2). For ease of discussion, this Article will refer to § 2000e2(a)(l) as the first provision and§ 2000e-2(a)(2) as the second provision.
In Inclusive Communities, five Supreme Court Justices agreed that the
second provision is both a disparate impact provision and a disparate treatment
provision. 10 Even Justice Thomas agreed that the second provision is a
disparate treatment provision. 11 Under this new textual reading, both the first
and second provisions relate to disparate treatment claims. Justice Kennedy's
reading forces a fresh analysis of Title VII (and the ADEA). Even though Title
VII has been on the books for more than fifty years, the second provision has
been largely ignored outside the disparate impact context and is, therefore,
both underused and undertheorized. It is as if a new provision of Title VII has
been discovered.
Reading the second provision as a disparate treatment provision should also
spell the end of the adverse action doctrine developed by the lower federal
courts. Under this doctrine, courts have declared a wide swath of conduct as
not serious enough to count as discrimination. For example, many courts have
declared it legal for an employer to give an employee a negative evaluation
because of her race or sex. 12 Courts also have held that discipline and lateral
transfers do not count as discrimination. 13 However, if Title VII's second
provision defines illegal disparate treatment, it is clear that the adverse action
9

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012).
Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2512, 2516-21 (2015).
11 Id. at 2526 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
12 See, e.g., Taylor v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. l l-CV-3582, 2012 WL 5989874, at "'5
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012) (determining that being rated as having unsatisfactory
performance is not sufficient to constitute an adverse action); Sotomayor v. City of New
York, 862 F. Supp. 2d 226, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating that criticizing an employee "in
the course of evaluating and correcting her work is not an adverse employment action"
under the statute), aff'd, 713 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2013); Siddiqi v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps.
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 353, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Johnson v. Frank, 828 F. Supp. 1143,
1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that a rating of "unacceptable" in a mid-year review is not
an adverse employment action).
13
Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 2007); Chukwuka v. City of
New York, 795 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that "threats of disciplinary
action ... do not constitute adverse employment actions in the absence of other negative
results" (quoting Uddin v. City of New York, 427 F. Supp. 2d 414, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))),
affd, 513 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2013); Santana v. U.S. Tsubaki, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 720,
721 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
10
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doctrine should no longer exist. The second provision prohibits employer
actions that "limit ... employees ... in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee." 14 To the extent that the adverse action
doctrine has a statutory basis, it derives from Title VII's first provision that
prohibits employers from discriminating in the "terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment." 15 Title VII's second provision does not contain this language
and is textually much broader than the first provision.
Justice Kennedy's reading of Title VII's second provision suggests that
there should not be a sharp line between disparate impact and disparate
treatment. Rather, disparate impact and disparate treatment are similar to one
another and even derive from the same substantive provision. Breaking down
the perceived sharp line between disparate impact and disparate treatment
cases opens up new theoretical and practical possibilities for Title VII.
This Article explores several of these new possibilities. Justice Kennedy's
new reading of Title VII creates space to explore new frameworks for
analyzing discrimination, ones that combine elements of intentional and
nonintentional discrimination. The new reading also requires a complete
rethinking of harassment doctrine, which to date draws solely from Title VII' s
first provision. Reading the second provision as one that relates to disparate
treatment claims also means that an employee can prevail on an individual
discrimination claim without showing any kind of intent. This is a major
reshaping of current discrimination law. Even if courts continue to cling to
intent as an element of disparate treatment claims, courts should re-evaluate
their current notions of intent in light of the new possibilities offered by Title
VII's second provision.
Justice Kennedy's new idea also should lead courts to re-examine the test
promulgated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 16 which is the central test
used by courts to evaluate intentional discrimination cases. It also makes it less
likely that recent Supreme Court opinions are correct when they compare the
federal discrimination statutes to tort law. 17
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I discusses the way the Supreme
Court has described discrimination claims and the proof structures it has
developed. Part II discusses the concept of "adverse action" and how it sharply
restricts the harms courts recognize as discrimination. Part III provides an indepth analysis of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and Justice Thomas's
dissent in Inclusive Communities. 18 Part IV explores why this opinion should
14

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l ).
16 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
17 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013); Gross v.
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176-77 (2009).
18 Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2510 (2015).
15
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eliminate the adverse action doctrine currently developing in the lower federal
courts. Part V proposes numerous theoretical and practical innovations that
could result from Justice Kennedy's opinion.
I.

THE FALSE DICHOTOMY

Justice Kennedy's new reading of Title VU fundamentally shifts the way
courts have heretofore understood Title VII. To understand why, it is first
necessary to briefly examine the pre-existing case law and scholarly literature.
The case law and much of the scholarly commentary proceed from a common
premise: the idea that disparate treatment and disparate impact claims evolved
from two separate parts of Title VU.
Title VII is the cornerstone of federal employment discrimination law. Title
VU prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because of
race, sex, national origin, color, or religion. 19 Courts and scholars commonly
describe Title VU as providing two kinds of claims: disparate treatment and
disparate impact. While also contesting the dichotomy, Noah Zatz has noted
that "[flew propositions are less controversial or more embedded in the
structure of Title VU analysis than that the statute recognizes only '"disparate
treatment" and "disparate impact" theories of employment discrimination. "'20
Courts often proclaim that a "plaintiff can bring a Title VII claim under either
a disparate treatment theory or a disparate impact theory."21 Indeed, even the
Supreme Court "has recognized that two forms of discrimination are prohibited
under Title VII: disparate treatment and disparate impact."22
Courts and scholars have also noted that disparate treatment and disparate
impact claims derive from two separate provisions within Title VII. 23 Under
Title VII's first provision, it is unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."24 Courts characterize this first provision as describing disparate
treatment claims. 25 They also commonly note that a disparate treatment claim
19
20

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation,
and the Disaggregation ofDiscriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1368 (2009).
21
Fuller v. Gen. Cable Indus., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 726, 727 (E.D. Tex. 2000); see also
Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F .3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2006).
22 Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 617 n.2 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977).
23
See infra Sections II.A & II.B. This sentence is meant to be descriptive and does not
describe the author's view of the discrimination statutes.
24
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
25
See, e.g., Farmer v. Campbell Soup Supply Co., No. 1:14CV179, 2014 WL 1608282,
at *1-2 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 22, 2014); Copeling v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., No. 12 C
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requires an employee to prove that an employer intentionally discriminated. 26
As one court stated, "[i]f there was no discriminatory intent, there cannot be
liability under ... Title VII, on a disparate treatment theory."27 Under Title
VII' s second provision, it is unlawful for an employer "to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."28
These two, main operative provisions form the foundation of Title VII's
text. Courts and scholars routinely refer to this second provision as the genesis
of disparate impact claims under Title VII. 29 In case after case, the Supreme
Court has indicated that the first provision refers to disparate treatment, and the
second provision refers to disparate impact. 30 Not surprisingly, this dichotomy
has rarely been explicitly litigated in the lower federal courts. For example,
when faced with questions about the dichotomy, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the current reading was "too long
established to be lightly overruled."31
The supposed dichotomy between these two provisions is important because
it has huge implications for both the theory and the practice of federal
discrimination law. As described more fully below, courts believe that
disparate impact and disparate treatment have their own animating ideologies
and also their own separate proof structures. They also tend to presume that
disparate treatment and disparate impact represent a complete description of
the type of claims recognized under Title VII. Although this Article will
largely focus on Title VII, its reasoning would also apply to federal age and
10316, 2014 WL 540443, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2014) ("Subsection (a)(l) prohibits
disparate treatment, while subsection (a)(2) prohibits employment practices that result in a
disparate impact against a protected group."); Mays v. BNSF Ry. Co., 974 F. Supp. 2d
1166, 1169 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Knight v. G.W. Plastics, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 674, 679 (D. Vt.
1995).
26 See, e.g., Melendez v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 79 F.3d 661, 669 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that
under Title VII a plaintiff must "prove that he has been the victim of intentional
discrimination").
27 Grano v. Dep't of Dev. of Columbus, 637 F.2d 1073, 1082 (6th Cir. 1980).
2s 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
29 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 236 (2005); Copeling, 2014 WL 540443, at
*2; Mays, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 1169; Marcia L. McCormick, The Allure and Danger of
Practicing Law as Taxonomy, 58 ARK. L. REV. 159, 174 (2005) ("Section (a)(2) ... has
been interpreted to prohibit discriminatory effects, and that theory is labeled disparate
impact."); see also Aldridge v. City of Memphis, No. 05-2966-STA-dkv, 2008 WL
2999557, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. July 31, 2008) (characterizing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) of ADEA
analogously), aff'd, 404 F. App'x 29 (6th Cir. 2010).
30 See, e.g., Smith, 544 U.S. at 234-35; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 n.l
(1971).
31 EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 252 (6th Cir. 1988).
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disability discrimination claims. The ADEA and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (the "ADA") have similar, although not identical, operative
language. 32
A.

Disparate Impact

The history of disparate impact in Supreme Court opinions begins in 1971.
In the seminal case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court
interpreted Title VII to allow plaintiffs to assert discrimination based on a
disparate impact theory. 33 Griggs preceded the Supreme Court's sharp tum
toward textualism in the 1980s and cannot be characterized as a textual
opinion. 34 In a footnote, the Supreme Court noted that Title VII's second
provision was a disparate impact provision. 35
In Griggs, the Court did not discuss how disparate impact theory derives
from the text of Title VII. Rather, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the
purposes of Title VII and the way that race played a role in employment
outcomes. The Supreme Court announced an animating principle for disparate
impact, reasoning that Title VII prohibited not only intentional conduct but
policies and practices that created "built-in headwinds" to the hiring of black
employees. 36 The Supreme Court articulated a reason for recognizing a
category of discrimination called disparate impact and began to provide a
rudimentary structure for evaluating it. 37 This rudimentary structure provided
that the employer's testing and high school diploma requirements at issue in
the case were discriminatory because they did not "bear a demonstrable
relationship to successful performance. " 38
32

The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
age" or to "limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's age .... " 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012).
The ADA, meanwhile, prohibits discrimination "against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training,
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). It
then further defines discrimination in a separate subsection, containing seven separate
definitional sections. Id. § 12112(b)(1 )-(7).
33 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 ("Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation.").
34
Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2544 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (positing that Griggs did "not even cite the
provision of Title VII on which the plaintiffs' claims were based").
35
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426 n.1 (focusing only briefly on the text of the statute).
36 Id. at 432.
37
Id. at 431.
38 Id.
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Over time, the Supreme Court further developed, refined, and altered this
basic structure through a series of cases, 39 including Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust4° and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio. 41 In Watson, the
Court (in a portion of the opinion joined by a plurality) indicated that to prove
a disparate impact the plaintiff must identify "the specific employment practice
that is challenged" and must establish statistical evidence of a kind and degree
sufficient to show that the employment practice caused the disparity. 42 The
burden of production then shifts to the defendant to show that "its employment
practices are based on legitimate business reasons."43 Once the defendant
meets this burden, the plaintiff can prevail by showing that other practices
could have been used that would not create the same disparity. 44 A year later,
in Wards Cove, a five-Justice majority largely reaffirmed the Watson
plurality's interpretation of the requirements for proving a disparate impact
claim.45
Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to explicitly codify disparate impact
into Title VII. 46 The 1991 amendments imported the concept of a specific
employment practice from the case law, but also allowed plaintiffs the ability
to challenge combined practices that created a disparate impact if they were
unable to separate the practices.47 Under the amendment, once the plaintiff
shows that an employment practice creates a disparate impact based on a
protected trait, it is the employer's burden to establish that a practice is "job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity."48
However, even if the defendant establishes this affirmative defense, the
plaintiff may prevail by proving that the employer could have adopted alternate
practices that would not result in a disparate impact. 4 9
In 2005, the Supreme Court also interpreted the ADEA as providing a
disparate impact claim. 50 In doing so, the Supreme Court relied on the ADEA's
second provision, which is textually identical to Title VII's second provision,
except that it substitutes age as the protected class. 51 In recognizing disparate
39
40
41
42

43
44
45

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
487 U.S. 977, 982 (1988).
490 U.S. 642, 651 (1989).
Watson, 487 U.S. at 994.
Id. at 998.
Id.

Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2012)).
47
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B).
48
Id. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i).
49 See id. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(ii) (describing how "the complaining party" can
demonstrate "an alternative employment practice" that the employer "refuses to adopt").
50
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005).
51 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012).
46
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impact under the ADEA, the Supreme Court relied heavily on its earlier
decision in Griggs and even noted, "We thus squarely held that § 703(a)(2) of
Title VII did not require a showing of discriminatory intent."52 In the ADEA
context, the Supreme Court explicitly referred to and interpreted the ADEA's
second provision as relating to disparate impact. 53 While the Supreme Court
recognized disparate impact claims under the ADEA, it created a new test for
ADEA disparate impact claims, based at least in part on perceived differences
in the text and purposes of the ADEA and Title VII. 54
There are three main themes to take away from this Section. First, the
Supreme Court's pre-existing cases directly stated that disparate impact claims
derive from the second provisions of Title VII and the ADEA. Second, the
Supreme Court's pre-existing cases imagined a very specific animating
purpose for disparate impact cases-to provide a remedy when there is not
intentional discrimination. Finally, these pre-existing cases assume that the
textual and theoretical differences between disparate impact and disparate
treatment demand separate proof structures. A plaintiff trying to establish a
disparate impact claim must prove different factors than a plaintiff trying to
prove disparate treatment.
B.

Disparate Treatment

The Supreme Court has called disparate treatment "the most easily
understood type of discrimination."55 Such cases require the plaintiff "to prove
that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive." 56 Surprisingly, the
federal courts have created a complex array of frameworks that they use to
analyze these "easy" disparate treatment cases. 57 A full discussion of the
frameworks and all of their nuances is not necessary here, but it is helpful to
discuss three different ways of thinking about disparate treatment: direct
evidence cases, mixed-motive cases, and harassment cases.
During the 1960s, plaintiffs often claimed that employers were making
explicit race- or gender-based decisions according to company policies. 58
Smith, 544 U.S. at 235.
Id. at 232-33.
54 Id. at 233 ("Unlike Title VII, however, [the ADEA] contains language that
significantly narrows its coverage by permitting any 'otherwise prohibited' action 'where
the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age' .... "); see also Meacham
v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 87 (2008) (refining further the ADEA disparate
impact test).
55
Int'! Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
56
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988).
57
See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV.
69 (2011).
58
See, e.g., Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 368, 374 (E.D. La. 1968) (alleging
that an employer engaged in discrimination by only hiring union members, when union
itself engaged in discriminatory membership practices); Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
52

53
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These claims of facially discriminatory policies later became grouped into a
type of individual disparate treatment case referred to as a direct evidence
case. 59 Courts tended to use simple formulations in evaluating direct evidence
cases, essentially requiring a plaintiff to establish that a decision was taken
because of a protected trait. 60 Although it is rare that modern courts will
characterize a case as a direct evidence case, employees can proceed under a
direct evidence framework if they have strong evidence of discrimination. 61
For example, if a supervisor told an employee that he was not promoting her
because he did not think women should be in positions of authority, this would
be a direct evidence case. The employee has evidence that a decision maker
explicitly took sex into account when deciding which employee to promote.
In 1973, the Supreme Court issued a decision that radically changed the way
courts analyze discrimination cases. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 62
the Supreme Court created a three-part, burden-shifting test for analyzing
individual disparate treatment cases that did not rely on direct evidence. 63
277 F. Supp. 117, 117-18 (S.D. Ga. 1967) (alleging that an employer had a policy of making
gender a qualification for switchman position); Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp.
781, 781 (E.D. La. 1967) (alleging discrimination based on a company policy that required
women to resign upon marriage); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332, 336
(S.D. Ind. 1967) (alleging that a company's use of male and female layoff lists was
discriminatory).
59 See, e.g., Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2000) (indicating
that a company policy of discrimination constitutes direct evidence). Outside of the context
of facially discriminatory policies, courts have had a difficult time defining direct evidence,
and definitions regarding what constitutes direct evidence vary. While the definitions of
these terms appear to vary slightly by circuit, direct evidence of discrimination can be
described as "evidence, that, if believed, proves the existence of a fact in issue without
inference or presumption .... [and] is composed of only the most blatant remarks, whose
intent could be nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of some impermissible
factor." Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 n.2 (I Ith Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (quoting
Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (I Ith Cir. 1999)). One court has described
direct evidence as that which "essentially requires an admission by the employer," and also
has explained that "such evidence is rare." Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724,
733 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). "A statement that can plausibly be interpreted two
different ways---one discriminatory and the other benign--<loes not directly reflect illegal
animus, and, thus, does not constitute direct evidence." Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d
1147, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hall v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 476 F.3d 847, 854
(10th Cir. 2007)).
60 See, e.g., Mach v. Will Cty. Sheriff, 580 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 2009) ("The direct
method required Mach to produce direct or circumstantial evidence that the Sheriff
transferred him because of his age."); Paz v. Wauconda Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 464
F.3d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 2006) (suggesting that under the direct method of proving
discrimination a court should not use a burden-shifting framework).
61 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002).
62 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
63 Id. at 802-03. Some circuits will allow a plaintiff to make a case of discrimination
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Under McDonnell Douglas, a court first evaluates the prima. facie case,
which requires the following proof:
(i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. 64
The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the applicant's rejection. 65 If the defendant meets
this requirement, the plaintiff can still prevail by demonstrating that the
defendant's reason for the rejection was simply pretext. 66 In McDonnell
Douglas itself, the Court noted that the facts required to prove a prima facie
case will necessarily vary depending on the case. 67 As the lower federal courts
began applying McDonnell Douglas to different factual scenarios, they began
to develop different iterations of the test, following its basic three-part, burdenshifting structure, while substituting different language within the prima facie
case. Over time, the Supreme Court clarified and altered the McDonnell
Douglas test. 68
After McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court created a new framework for
evaluating mixed-motive cases. 69 In a mixed-motive case, there is evidence
that both discriminatory and legitimate reasons played a role in an employment
decision or outcome. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court held that a
plaintiff must establish that a protected trait was a motivating factor in the
employment decision. 70 The employer has the ability to avoid liability by
proving an affirmative defense-that it would have made the same decision
even if it had not allowed the protected trait to play a role.7 1
without resorting to McDonnell Douglas if the plaintiff has "either direct or circumstantial
evidence that supports an inference of intentional discrimination." Coffman v. Indianapolis
Fire Dep't, 578 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2009).
64 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
65 Id.

Id. at 804.
Id. at 802 n.13.
68 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (holding that while the fact
finder's rejection of the employer's proffered reason permits the fact finder to infer
discrimination, it does not compel such a finding); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981) (explaining that the defendant's burden at the second step in
the framework is a burden of production only).
69
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-43 (1989).
70 Id. at 244-45. For a description of how the same decision language was imported from
constitutional claims, see Catherine T. Struve, Shifting Burdens: Discrimination Law
Through the Lens ofJury Instructions, 51 B.C. L. REV. 279, 300-01 (2010).
71 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45; see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S.
90, 92 (2003) (resolving a question left unresolved in Price Waterhouse regarding whether a
66

67
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In 1991, Congress amended Title Vll to partially codify the holding of Price
Waterhouse. 72 Congress indicated that a plaintiff could prevail on a
discrimination claim under Title Vll by establishing that a protected trait was a
motivating factor in an employment decision. 73 Congress also created an
affirmative defense, which, if proven, would be a partial defense to damages. 74
Courts began referring to the 1991 amendments as establishing a mixed-motive
claim with a two-part framework. 75
The Supreme Court later took a very different approach to mixed-motive
cases in the ADEA discrimination and Title Vll retaliation contexts. The
Supreme Court held that for an employee to prevail on either one of these
claims, she must establish that her protected trait or protected activity was the
"but for" cause of the contested employment outcome. 76
The Supreme Court also has recognized harassment claims and created a
separate test for evaluating them. 77 To be actionable, a hostile work
environment must affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. 78
In interpreting when harassment rises to this level, the Court held that it must
be "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's

plaintiff must provide direct evidence to be entitled to a mixed-motive framework).
72
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012)).
73
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) ("[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice .... ").
74
Id. at § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). As with the disparate impact framework, when Congress
added the motivating factor language to Title VII, it did not make similar changes to the
ADEA or ADA. Struve, supra note 70, at 288. The question eventually arose whether
mixed-motive claims were actionable under the ADEA. In Gross v. FBL Financial Services,
Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs proceeding under the
ADEA must prove that age was the "but for'' cause of the alleged employment action. Id. at
176-77.
75
See, e.g., Porter v. Natsios, 414 F.3d 13, 18-19 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
76
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013) (claiming that
Congress must have legislated with the backdrop of default tort law principles in mind);
Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (reasoning that the plain meaning of the ADEA's language creates a
"but for" causation requirement). As of the writing of this Article, it is uncertain whether
litigants can still use the McDonnell Douglas test in either ADEA or Title VII retaliation
cases, although many circuit courts have allowed it. See, e.g., Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila.,
776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (analyzing ADEA, Title VII, and the state claims under
the McDonnell Douglas framework); Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93,
110-11 (2d Cir. 2010) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to Title VII and ADEA
retaliation claims); Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 544 (6th Cir. 2008)
(holding that McDonnell Douglas is the appropriate framework for retaliation claims under
the ADEA and Title VII).
77
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
78
Id. at 67.
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employment."79 In 1993, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff alleging
harassment need not allege psychological injury, but would be required to
establish that she subjectively believed the environment to be hostile or
abusive and that the environment would be so viewed by an objective person. 80
In making this latter inquiry, the Court stated:
But we can say that whether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can
be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may
include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether
it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance. 81
The Court also indicated that the harassing conduct must be unwelcome. 82

Id. (citation omitted).
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) ("Likewise, ifthe victim does
not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered
the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation.").
81
Id. at 23. Although there are some variations, courts tend to articulate a harassment
claim as requiring (1) proof that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, (2) that she
was subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) that the harassment was based on sex, and (4)
that it affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment. Sandoval v. Am. Bldg.
Maint. Indus., Inc., 578 F.3d 787, 801 (8th Cir. 2009). The fourth element contains both
objective and subjective components, requiring the harassment to be "severe or pervasive
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment," as well as requiring
the victim to subjectively perceive the working conditions to be so altered. Id. (citations
omitted).Even as the contours of harassment claims become fixed, employer liability for
harassment remained unresolved. In 1998, the Supreme Court addressed agency issues.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 746-47 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998). Continuing with its reliance on proof structures, the Court
once again enunciated a multi-part test. An employer will be liable for a supervisor's
harassment that results in a tangible employment action. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762; Faragher,
524 U.S. at 778. The Court defined a tangible employment action as "a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 524
U.S. at 761. If a supervisor engages in harassment that does not result in a tangible
employment action, then the employer can avoid liability by establishing an affirmative
defense. As articulated by the Court, the affirmative defense has two elements: "(a) that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 777-78.
82
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
79

80
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Over time, the federal courts have also adopted separate tests for failure to
accommodate,83 retaliation, 84 and pattern or practice. 85
Notice that the frameworks for disparate treatment cases do not mimic or
overlap the frameworks used in disparate impact cases. Disparate impact cases
focus largely on three factors: (1) identification of the contested practice or
practices; (2) whether there is significant statistical proof that a practice had a
disproportionate impact; and (3) whether the employer can establish an
available affirmative defense. In contrast, the frameworks for disparate
treatment focus on concepts such as intent and causation-they rely more
heavily on evidence of what supervisors or coworkers did or said.
Not only are the frameworks different, but the two concepts are often
described as having different animating purposes. Disparate impact focuses on
the effects of decisions that are not facially discriminatory. For the most part,
disparate treatment is recognized in cases where race, sex, or other protected
traits are explicitly taken into account in making a negative decision. Recall
that courts largely conceive of these two kinds of discrimination as emanating
from separate sources. Courts repeatedly cite Title VII's second provision as
the disparate impact provision. They repeatedly cite the first provision as the
disparate treatment provision.
My prior scholarly work and the work of a small number of other scholars
have challenged this dichotomy between disparate impact and disparate
treatment claims. 86 Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the overwhelming
consensus, at least descriptively, is that disparate impact and disparate

83 See, e.g., Gratz! v. Office of the Chief Judges of the 12th, 18th, 19th & 22nd Judicial
Circuits, 601 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing elements of failure to accommodate
claim under ADA). Failure to accommodate does not derive from the same operative
language as other discrimination claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) (providing for
religious accommodation); Id. at§§ 12111(9)-(10), 12112(b)(5)(A) (providing for disability
accommodation).
84 See, e.g., Collazo v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Mfg., Inc., 617 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2010).
Sometimes, retaliation claims derive from a statute's primary operative language, and other
times statutes have separate retaliation provisions. Compare Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 533
U.S. 474, 481 (2008) (construing ADEA federal sector discrimination prohibition to also
prohibit retaliation), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (creating an anti-retaliation provision
under Title VII).
85 See, e.g., Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2009)
(describing pattern or practice framework). The Supreme Court first enunciated the pattern
or practice framework in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977), drawing from its earlier decision in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424
U.S. 747 (1976). Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (allowing
EEOC to file pattern or practice suits).
86 See Sperino, supra note 57, at 94; see also David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent
Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 920 (1993); Zatz, supra note 20, at 1360
(suggesting that Title VII could be read to "mandate[] reasonable accommodation by
employers").
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treatment are two separate claims that derive from two separate places within
Title VII, and that therefore demand separate proof structures. As shown later
in Parts III and V, Justice Kennedy's interpretation of Title Vll in Inclusive
Communities has the power to radically change this current understanding.
II.

ADVERSE ACTIONS

One key feature of modem employment discrimination jurisprudence is the
dichotomy between disparate impact and disparate treatment cases. Another
key feature is the growing power of the adverse action doctrine in the lower
federal courts. Under the adverse action doctrine, a court will dismiss a case
because an employee has not alleged a workplace harm that is serious enough
to result in legal liability. Imagine an employee named Michaela. Michaela is
black. Her supervisor Bill is white. Bill accidentally copies Michaela on an
email in which he states he "will never give a black employee a positive
evaluation." Later, Bill gives Michaela a negative evaluation. Is Bill's conduct
legal discrimination? According to one of the most important federal appellate
courts in the country, the answer is no.s 7 The negative evaluation does not
count as discrimination.
The scenario described in the preceding paragraph is derived from a
hypothetical created by the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit.SS Here is how the appellate court reached its decision that a negative
evaluation, even if based on race, does not count as discrimination. The
appellate court relied on a large number of cases requiring a plaintiff
proceeding under Title Vll to prove she suffered an adverse employment
action. s9 These cases defined an adverse action as "a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant
change in benefits."90 The appellate court referred to the "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment" language in Title VII's first provision, which the
court interpreted as requiring that an employee "experience[] materially
adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment or future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of
fact could find objectively tangible harm.''9 1 The appellate court further noted
that "not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse
action.''92

87
88
89

Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Id.

Id. at 552.
Id. (citing Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998))).
91
Id. (quoting Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Holcomb
v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 902 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
92
Id. (quoting Russell v. Principi, 257 F.3d 815, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
90
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In many cases, judges have used the court-created adverse action doctrine to
limit the reach of discrimination law. Under the adverse action doctrine, courts
have deemed a wide range of conduct as falling outside the reach of federal
discrimination law. Even if an employee has evidence that the employer took
an action because of the employee's race or sex, courts will not label such
conduct discrimination. Although the cases are not completely uniform, courts
have held that the following conduct is not discriminatory:
• giving an employee a negative evaluation or write-up; 93
• denying a lateral transfer;94
• transferring an employee to a less desirable job;95

•
•
•

reprimanding or threatening an employee with disciplinary
action; 96
excessively scrutinizing an employee's job performance; 97
threatening to lire an employee;98

93
See, e.g., Taylor v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 11-CV-3582, 2012 WL 5989874, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012) (being rated as having unsatisfactory performance not sufficient
to constitute an adverse action); Sotomayor v. City of New York, 862 F. Supp. 2d 226, 254
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) ("Criticism of an employee in the course of evaluating and correcting her
work is not an adverse employment action."), a.ffd, 713 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2013); Siddiqi v.
N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 353, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Johnson v.
Frank, 828 F. Supp. 1143, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
94 See, e.g., Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 2007); Santana v. U.S.
Tsubaki, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 720, 721 (N.D. Ohio 2009) ("Plaintiff cannot meet this
burden, because, as a matter of law, the Sixth Circuit has held that the mere denial of a
'lateral transfer' does not, absent something more in terms of the negative aspects of its
impact, constitute an adverse employment action.").
95 See, e.g., Lara v. Unified Sch. Dist. # 501, No. 08-3320, 2009 WL 3382612, at *3
(10th Cir. Oct. 22, 2009) (holding that a threatened transfer is not enough to constitute an
unlawful employment practice); Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274
(7th Cir. 1996); Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994)
(being given more stressful job duties is not sufficient); Craven v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal
Justice-Institutional Div., 151 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (N.D. Tex. 2001); cf Sanchez v. Denver
Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a job transfer that increases a
teacher's commute from a few minutes to between thirty and forty minutes is not sufficient).
But see Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (allowing that some lateral
transfers do constitute adverse actions); Collins v. Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 703 (7th Cir. 1987)
(finding that an adverse action occurred when an employer moved an employee's office to
an undesirable location, and forbade her from using the firm's stationery and support
services).
96 See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 795 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), a.ffd,
513 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2013).
97
See id.
98 See Myers v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, Civ. No. CCB-09-3391, 2010 WL 3120070, at *5
(D. Md. Aug. 9, 2010) (holding that negative performance-related discussions are not
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assigning additional work;99
assigning more difficult job assignments; lOO and
refusing to recommend an employee for an award that might
result in a monetary award that is thirty-five times the
employee's annual salary.101

Even if an employee presents evidence that these actions were taken because
of a protected trait, courts will hold that the employee has not suffered the kind
of harm for which legal redress is available.
This idea that intentional discrimination claims are confined by the "terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment" language in Title VII's first
provision also plays a large role in harassment cases. Again, an example from
an actual case is helpful. In one case, an employee presented evidence that he
was repeatedly subjected to racial symbols and racial slurs at work. 102 He
testified that his coworkers displayed the rebel flag on toolboxes and on work
hats, and that he saw the letters "KKK" on a bathroom wall and one other
location in the workplace. 103 He testified that supervisors repeatedly referred to
him using racial epithets or racially charged language, including calling him
the N-word and calling him "boy." 104 He presented evidence that a supervisor
told him two or three times that he was going to kick his "black ass." 105 He
also presented evidence that another supervisor told him if he looked at "that
white girl" he would "cut" him. 106 The court held as a matter of law that this
employee did not have a claim for racial harassment. 107 The court held that
what happened to this employee, if true, was not sufficiently severe or
pervasive to count as racial harassment. 108 The outcome of this case is driven
by the "severe or pervasive" requirement in harassment cases. This concept,
like the adverse action concept in other discrimination cases, limits the reach of
harassment law.

sufficient to give rise to a claim).
99 Han v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d 769, 789 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
("Generally, an increase in job responsibilities is not an adverse action.").
100
White v. Hall, 389 F. App'x 956, 960 (11th Cir. 2010) (dismissing a claim because an
alleged increase in workload is not sufficiently tangible to state a claim).
101 Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
102
Barrow v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 144 F. App'x 54, 57 (11th Cir. 2005).
103 Id.
104 Id.
10s Id.
106 Id.
107

108

Id. at 58.
Id. at 57-58.
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The Supreme Court recognized harassment in the case of Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson. 109 In doing so, the Supreme Court derived the harassment
cause of action from Title VII's first provision, the provision that contains the
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" language. 110 The Court's
opinion focused heavily on how a sexually or racially offensive environment
affects these terms, conditions, or privileges. 111 Given its focus on the "terms,
conditions, or privileges" language in Meritor, the Court indicated that there
would be some conduct that would not meet these standards. 112 The Court
interpreted federal discrimination law to require an employee to show that the
harassment was "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the
victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment. "' 113 These
words do not appear anywhere in the text of Title VII. Rather, they are a
judicial gloss on or an explanation of Title VII' s first provision.
In Meritor, a bank teller alleged that her supervisor "made repeated
demands upon her for sexual favors . . . both during and after business
hours, . . . fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into the
women's restroom when she went there alone, exposed himself to her, and
even forcibly raped her on several occasions." 114 In the Meritor case, there was
no question that the employee's evidence, if proven, was serious enough to be
called harassment.
In a later case, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 115 the Supreme Court
provided more details about what "severe or pervasive" means. 116 It held that
harassment exists when "the [employee's] environment would reasonably be
perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive." 117 To determine whether
harassment occurred, the factfinder should look at all of the circumstances,
including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." 118
When evaluating whether conduct is severe or pervasive, courts should
consider what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would think.
Importantly, this second case relied solely on Title VII's first provision as the
basis for the harassment claim. 119 The Supreme Court did not consider how
Title VII's second provision might affect its analysis.
1
09
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

111
118

119

477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
Id. at 63-67 (likening sexual harassment to "harassment based on race").
Id. at 63-66.
Id. at 67 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971).
Id. (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
Id. at 60.
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 23.
See id. at 21.

2016]

JUSTICE KENNEDY'S BIG NEW IDEA

1807

The "severe or pervasive" requirement is a court-created doctrine. Some
conduct is clearly going to be so serious that it always counts as harassment.
For example, if a supervisor rapes an employee, no court wound deny that this
conduct fits within the definition of severe. 120 Or, if a woman is subjected to
sexual epithets and taunting every day for a lengthy period, courts would agree
that the harassment is pervasive. 121 Some conduct is never going to meet this
standard. For example, if a supervisor refuses to sing "Happy Birthday" to an
employee because of her sex, this one minor incident would not trigger
liability. This bottom limit is expressed through the legal concept de minimis
non curat lex. 122
In the middle, some judges see an area of uncertainty. Here are examples of
cases that judges have dismissed because they were not severe or pervasive
enough to constitute harassment:
•

•

•

Plaintiff presented evidence that "supervisor repeatedly asked
[her] about her personal life, told her how beautiful she was,
asked her out on dates, called her a 'dumb blond,' put his hands
on her shoulders at least six times, placed 'I love you' signs in
her work area, and tried to kiss her on three occasions. "123
Plaintiff presented evidence that a coworker "placed his hand on
her stomach and commented on its softness and sexiness. " 124
After Plaintiff told her coworker "to stop touching her and then
forcefully pushed him away," he "forced his hand underneath her
sweater and bra to fondle her bare breast." 125 After she told him
he had "crossed the line," he again tried to fondle her breasts but
stopped when another employee arrived at the office. 126
Plaintiff presented evidence that her supervisor told her "she had
been voted the 'sleekest ass' in the office" and, on another
occasion, "deliberately touched [her] breasts with some papers
that he was holding in his hand." 127

See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
See Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. at 19.
122
See, e.g., G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Elm St. Chiropractic, Ltd., 871 F. Supp. 2d 763, 768
(N.D. Ill. 2012) (citing Wis. Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214,
231 (1992)). De minimis non curat lex is literally: "The law does not concern itself with
trifles."
123
Bonora v. UGI Utils., Inc., No. CIV.A. 99-5539, 2000 WL 1539077, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 18, 2000) (citing Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 338 (7th Cir. 1993)).
124
Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 921, 926 (9th Cir. 2000).
125
Id. at 92 l.
126 Id.
120
121

127

Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 768 (2d Cir. 1998).
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Plaintiff presented evidence that her supervisor repeatedly
"fondled his genitals in front of her and used lewd and sexually
inappropriate language. "128

Although it is not exactly clear how the current contours of the "severe or
pervasive" test connect to Title VII's statutory language, numerous courts have
cited to Title VII's first provision as the source of this requirement in
harassment cases. 129 The lower federal courts have construed the "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment" language in Title VII's first provision
as a significant limit on the types of harms for which Title VII will provide a
remedy. Importantly, the "serious or pervasive" standard is grounded in Title
VII's first provision. The Supreme Court has never considered whether a
harassment claim can be grounded in Title VII's second provision.
III. THE NEW TEXTUAL READING

A 2015 Supreme Court case has the power to radically change both the
adverse action doctrine and the perceived dichotomy between disparate impact
and disparate treatment claims. In Inclusive Communities, the Supreme Court
considered whether the Fair Housing Act provides a disparate impact cause of
action. 130 The Supreme Court held that plaintiffs could proceed on a disparate
impact theory under the FHA. 131 In doing so, both the majority opinion and
Justice Thomas's dissent point to a new reading of the federal employment
discrimination law.
The majority opinion in Inclusive Communities was written by Justice
Kennedy and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. It
begins by reciting the difference between disparate treatment and disparate
impact claims:
In contrast to a disparate-treatment case, where a "plaintiff must establish
that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive," a plaintiff
bringing a disparate impact claim challenges practices that have a
"disproportionately adverse effect on minorities" and are otherwise
unjustified by a legitimate rationale. 132
After outlining the facts of the case and the history of fair housing efforts in the
United States, Justice Kennedy turned to Title VII as a model for resolving the
128
Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1159 (8th Cir. 1999),
abrogated by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011).
129
See, e.g., Ostrofsky v. Sauer, No. CIV S-07-0987 MCE EFB PS, 2008 WL 283986, at
*1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2008); Knight v. CMH Homes, Inc., 3:07-CV-307, 2007 WL 2905608,
at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 3, 2007).
130
Tex. Dep't of Rous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2513 (2015).
131
Id. at 2525.
132
Id. at 2513.
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FHA question. 133 He referenced the Supreme Court's 1971 opinion in Griggs
and indicated that this case relied only on the second provision of Title VII
when establishing disparate impact as a cognizable claim under Title VII. 134
Justice Kennedy also noted that the Supreme Court interpreted the ADEA as
allowing for disparate impact liability. 135
Even though the language of the FHA does not mimic the language of Title
VII or the ADEA, Justice Kennedy used the reasoning and policy underlying
the employment discrimination cases to interpret the FHA. 136 The FHA makes
it illegal:
To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse
to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin.137
Justice Kennedy stated that the words "otherwise make unavailable" were the
critical words for the question before the Court. 138 He explained that these
words do not focus on intent, but rather on effects or outcomes. 139
Justice Kennedy then turned back to Title VII and the .ADEA as models.
Title VII's second provision indicates that it is an unlawful employment
practice for an employer:
[T]o limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 140

Similarly, the ADEA's second provision makes it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer:
[T]o limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's age .... 141
Justice Kennedy's analysis then took an interesting tum. Under the
conventional understanding of discrimination law, a reader would expect
Justice Kennedy to say that the second provisions of Title VII and the ADEA

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

Id. at 2516.
Id. at 2516-17.
Id. at2517.
Id. at 2518.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2518.
Id. at 2518-19.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (emphasis added).
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
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are disparate impact provisions. Rather than reading these second provisions as
solely relating to disparate impact, Justice Kennedy read them as containing
both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.
He explained: "'Otherwise' means 'in a different way or manner,' thus
signaling a shift in emphasis from an actor's intent to the consequences of his
actions." 142 He further opined about the meaning of the "otherwise adversely
affect" language:
Located at the end of lengthy sentences that begin with prohibitions on
disparate treatment, they serve as catchall phrases looking to
consequences, not intent. And all three statutes [the FHA, Title VII, and
the ADEA] use the word "otherwise" to introduce the results-oriented
phrase. 143
This reading radically reconceptualizes the second provision of both the
ADEA and Title VII. Justice Kennedy explicitly stated that the first portion of
Title VII's second provision is a disparate treatment provision, not a disparate
impact provision as commonly thought.
While arguing for a different outcome, Justice Thomas's dissent also
advocated for a different reading of Title VII's second provision. Justice
Thomas disagreed with the majority's holding that the FHA provides for a
disparate impact claim. 144 In rejecting this reading, Thomas also looked to Title
VII's text and jurisprudence for guidance. Justice Thomas argued that the
Supreme Court's 1971 Griggs opinion was wrong. 145 Under his reading, Title
VII's second provision has always been about disparate treatment and never
about disparate impact. He emphatically argued: "We should drop the pretense
that Griggs' interpretation of Title VII was legitimate. 'The Civil Rights Act of
1964 did not include an express prohibition on policies or practices that
produce a disparate impact. "'146
Admittedly, Justice Thomas would advocate for a very narrow reading of
Title VII' s second provision. He would read it as excluding disparate
impact, 147 and he would also interpret it to encompass narrow notions of both
intent and causation. 148 However, as discussed in the next Part, reading Title
VII's second provision as an intentional discrimination provision reshapes how
lower federal courts should think about the harm threshold for discrimination

142 Inclusive Cmtys., 135 s. Ct. at 2519 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1598 (1971)).
143 Id. (emphasis added).
144 Id. at 2531 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 2526.
146 Id. (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009)).
147 Justice Thomas did indicate that he might be willing to limit Griggs's holding to the
Title VII context for purposes of stare decisis. Id. at 2531.
148 Id. at 2526-27 (discussing how the second provision would encompass the "but-for"
causation model).
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claims. This change would substantially alter how some lower federal court
judges conceive of the employment discrimination statutes' reach.
IV. ELIMINATING THE CURRENT ADVERSE ACTION DOCTRINE
After Inclusive Communities, at least six members of the current Supreme
Court agree: both Title VII's first provision and its second provision relate to
disparate treatment cases. Interpreting Title VII in this way creates a strong
argument that the adverse action doctrine developing in the lower federal
courts is wrong. It also should lead to a rethinking of the "severe or pervasive"
requirement in harassment cases. Reading the second provision in this new
way should greatly expand the reach of the federal discrimination statutes. 149
Title VII's first provision prohibits employers from firing a person or
refusing to hire him or her because of a protected trait like race or sex. 150 Title
VII' s first provision also makes it illegal for an employer "otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment" because of a protected trait. 151 The
lower federal courts have not always used a strictly textual analysis in adverse
action cases, but some courts have interpreted this provision as requiring a
fairly high level of harm before Title VII provides a remedy. 152 As discussed
earlier, lower federal courts have dismissed discrimination cases by holding
that negative evaluations, lateral transfers, discipline, and other similar actions
are not serious enough to fall within Title VII's reach. 153
If we take Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and Justice Thomas's dissent
at face value and follow them to their logical conclusions, Title VII's reach is
much broader than many lower federal courts currently allow. Relying solely
on textual analysis, it is easy to see how this new way of looking at Title VII
disparate treatment claims radically changes how some courts currently view
their scope.
Under this new reading, Title VII's second provision makes it illegal for an
employer to "limit ... employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee" 154
because of a protected trait. There are four important terms that the second
provision adds to the analysis: "limit," "in any way," "employment
opportunities," and "tend to deprive."

149

Although the following discussion focuses on Title VII, similar arguments can also be
made in the ADEA and ADA contexts.
150 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2012) (forbidding adverse employment actions motivated
by one or more protected categories).
151 Id.
152
153
154

See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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The term "limit" does not refer to any specific kind of adverse employment
action. It does not rely on the "terms, conditions, or privileges" language of
Title VII's first provision. The term "in any way" also indicates that the second
provision is not confined to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.
The phrase "employment opportunities" also expand the reach of Title VII.
The word "opportunity" means "[a] chance for progress or advancement, as in
a career." 155 It also means "a chance to do something, or a situation in which it
is easy for you to do something."1 56
Doing a purely textual analysis, the second provision prohibits an employer
from doing things that reduce an employee's ability to progress or advance in
their career in any way. This is a very different, and much more expansive,
understanding of what Title VII prohibits than the current adverse action
concept percolating in the lower federal courts. Under the second provision, it
is much clearer that a negative evaluation should count as cognizable
discrimination if race, sex, or other protected traits played a role in the negative
evaluation. Negative evaluations are ways that employers express their
opinions about an employee's current work performance and also his or her
chances for promotions, raises, and other benefits. If an employee gets a
negative evaluation, that evaluation could later be used to decide whether the
employee gets fired as part of a reduction in force or whether the employee
gets asked to apply for promotions. If an employee gets a bad evaluation from
one supervisor, a new supervisor may read the bad evaluation, thus tainting the
new supervisor's views of the employee's work ethic and performance. Thus,
this negative evaluation either limits or potentially limits the employee's
opportunities.
This broader reading of Title VII is not only textually supported.
Importantly, this understanding is also in line with the Supreme Court's early
statements about Title VII's reach. In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court
noted that "[i]n the implementation of [employment] decisions, it is abundantly
clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise." 157
Reading Title VII' s second provision as a disparate treatment provision makes
it clear that Title VII is not limited to any formal definition of "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment. "158
The phrase "tend to deprive" also increases the reach of Title VII. That
language indicates that Title VII not only prohibits actions that actually do
deprive an employee of employment opportunities, but also those that might do
so in the future. Some courts have justified their refusal to recognize conduct
155

Opportunity, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/opportunity
[https://perma.cc/8CK4-K9G7] (last visited July 10, 2016).
156 Opportunity,
MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/
dictionary/british/opportunity [https://perma.cc/Q8ZE-RUCK] (last visited July 10, 2016).
157 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
158 In making this argument, I am not asserting that the lower federal courts have
properly construed the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges."
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as an adverse action because it has not yet caused the employee harm. 15 9 For
example, a court might state that a negative evaluation does not cause harm
until it results in termination, a demotion, or some other similar action. The
second provision eliminates this argument. A negative evaluation that might
deprive an employee of opportunities in the future is cognizable. The employee
does not need to wait for further harm to materialize. There is harm because of
the potential limit on future opportunities.
Justice Thomas's reading of the employment discrimination statutes would
go even further. Recall that Justice Kennedy reads the phrase "otherwise
adversely affect" as referring to disparate impact claims. However, Justice
Thomas does not. He interprets the entire second provision as relating to
disparate treatment claims. Under Justice Thomas's reading, any intentional
employer action that otherwise adversely affects an employee would be a
cognizable claim under Title VII. 160 Even Justice Kennedy's reading might
encompass a similarly broad interpretation of intentional discrimination claims.
Justice Kennedy sees the second provision as a hybrid of disparate treatment
and disparate impact language. It is possible to read Justice Kennedy's opinion
as being open to the possibility that the "otherwise adversely affect" language
in the second provision refers both to disparate treatment and disparate impact
claims.
The Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the adverse action
requirement outside of the retaliation and harassment contexts. Given that the
lower federal courts have developed a robust and sometimes contradictory
adverse action doctrine in discrimination cases, it is likely that the Supreme
Court will soon be asked to rule on this issue. Justice Kennedy's new reading
of Title VII thus comes at a crucial time for discrimination law. If the Court
takes up this issue, it should examine it through both Title VII's first and
second provisions.
Justice Kennedy's and Justice Thomas's readings also call for a fresh look at
harassment jurisprudence. When the Supreme Court defined harassment to
require that the plaintiff establish severe or pervasive conduct, the Court relied
solely on Title VII's first provision. 161 The Supreme Court has never
considered the contours of a harassment claim under Title VII's second
provision. A harassment claim derived from Title VII's second provision
should not contain the limit of severe or pervasive conduct, as currently
required to state a harassment claim. The "severe or pervasive" requirement
represents the Supreme Court's interpretation of the phrase "terms, conditions,

159

E.g., Littleton v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, 568 F.3d 641, 644 (8th Cir. 2009).
Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2527-28 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
161
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
160
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or privileges" in Title VII's first provision. 162 The second provision does not
contain the same limit. l63
Justice Kennedy's opinion and even Justice Thomas's dissent offer a
powerful way to change discrimination law. Recasting Title VII's second
provision as a disparate treatment provision should lead courts to abandon the
adverse action requirement in discrimination cases and to reconsider the
"severe or pervasive" requirement in harassment cases. In making these
arguments, I am not claiming that any action, no matter how small, would be
actionable under Title VII. A long-standing judicial canon prevents the law
from providing a remedy for de minimis harm. 164 However, there is a wide
swath of workplace conduct that is more than de minimis but that is not
cognizable under current understandings of "adverse action" or "severe or
pervasive." Reading Title VII's second provision as a disparate treatment
provision gives courts the opportunity to explore this interstitial space.

V. THE FUTURE OF DISCRIMINATION LAW
It is difficult to overstate the magnitude of Justice Kennedy's new reading of
Title VII in Inclusive Communities. It represents a revolutionary understanding
of both the theory and practice of employment discrimination law. Even
though Title VII has been the law for more than fifty years, its second
provision has largely been relegated to disparate impact claims and is,
therefore, both underused and undertheorized. Reframing the second provision
as a disparate treatment provision radically alters fundamental aspects of
discrimination law. In essence, it is as if, after fifty years, Justice Kennedy
discovered a new provision in Title VII. This exciting development provides
scholars with a fresh impetus to theorize Title VII with proper respect for both
its first and second provisions. It also demands a new textual analysis of Title
VII. In this Part, I discuss important changes that might result from this
expanded reading of Title VII.
A.

A Spectrum, Not a Dichotomy

Justice Kennedy's reading of Title VII provides a different mental picture
for framing discrimination laws' potential. Justice Kennedy's reading suggests
that discrimination is not a dichotomy, but a spectrum of actionable conduct.
This is a major theoretical shift in discrimination law.

See supra notes 109-29 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012) (lacking the phrase "terms, conditions, or
privileges").
164 See G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Elm St. Chiropractic, Ltd., 871 F. Supp. 2d 763, 768 (N.D. Ill.
2012) ("The doctrine of de minimis non curat lex is a bedrock principle of law that 'is part
of the established background of legal principles against which all enactments are
adopted.'" (quoting Wis. Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231
(1992))).
162
163
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When the Supreme Court decided Griggs in 1971, it set up the currently
perceived dichotomy between disparate impact and disparate treatment claims.
Griggs described disparate impact as not requiring proof of intent, 165 which
suggested that other discrimination claims did require such proof. The
implication that disparate impact does not require proof of intent and that all
other claims do, is one of the central, structural features of modern
discrimination law. Yet, in some ways, the dichotomy is quite accidental. The
fact that there are two main operative provisions also implied that there were
only two different ways of conceiving discrimination (disparate treatment and
disparate impact). Justice Kennedy's reading of Title VII invites courts to
disregard the accidental dichotomy created in Griggs. Disparate impact and
disparate treatment are no longer separate claims stemming from separate parts
of the statute. Rather, they are different ways of thinking about the same
concept: discrimination. Once it is clear that there is no dichotomy, there is
more space for thinking of other ways to conceptualize discrimination.
One way to imagine the practical implications of this shift is to think of
discrimination as a rail line. One platform on that line is intentional
discrimination claims. Indeed, this is a very popular platform for many
discrimination plaintiffs. These employees have evidence that supervisors or
coworkers intentionally took their race, sex, or other protected traits into
account in a negative way when making an employment decision. Plaintiffs'
lawyers may feel more confident framing their clients' cases as intentional
discrimination claims, because they may rightfully believe that judges and
juries are more likely to see intentional conduct as discriminatory, 166 and
because Title VII provides enhanced damages for intentional discrimination. 167
Another platform on the rail line is the disparate impact concept as later
codified within Title VII1 68 or as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the
ADEA context. 169 However, this rail line also contains other platforms,
platforms that we have failed to explore because we have tended to view
discrimination as a dichotomy rather than a spectrum.
Scholars have provided rich theoretical groundwork for thinking about
discrimination in other ways: structural discrimination, negligent
discrimination, and unconscious discrimination. Structural discrimination
theorists have proposed that the locus of discrimination is not always a bad
individual or a company policy, but rather unthinking assumptions about how
work is organized. 170 Structural discrimination often results from a mix of
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
Katie R. Eyer, That's Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of AntiDiscrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1278 (2012).
1 7
6 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(l) (2012).
1 8
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
169
See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005).
170 Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account ofDisparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 138 (2003).
16 5

166
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intentional, negligent, and unconscious motives and actions. Unconscious
discrimination posits that discrimination is not always caused by conscious
animus against a protected group. 171 David Benjamin Oppenheimer proposed a
theory of negligent discrimination. 172 Under this proposal, an employer would
be liable for negligent discrimination under two circumstances. First, the
employer would be liable "when [it] fails to take all reasonable steps to prevent
discrimination that it knows or should know is occurring, or that it expects or
should expect to occur. " 173 Second, an employer would face liability "when it
fails to conform its conduct to the statutorily established standard of care by
making employment decisions that have a discriminatory effect, without first
carefully examining its processes, searching for less discriminatory
alternatives, and examining its own motives for evidence of stereotyping. " 174
Thinking about discrimination as a dichotomy allows for easy dismissal of
claims based on structural discrimination, unconscious bias, or negligence. The
current framework assumes that an employee must prove intentional
discrimination or disparate impact. Since none of these claims fit comfortably
within either of those two models, it is easy to dismiss such claims as not being
viable discrimination claims. Under the current framework, if a claim does not
fit within either model, it must be dismissed because disparate treatment and
disparate impact represent the only acceptable ways of thinking about
discrimination. A switch to a spectrum framework invites more open inquiry
into these other types of discrimination.
For the most part, courts have funneled effects-based discrimination claims
through the disparate impact model. Remember that this model requires the
plaintiff to establish large statistical disparities between outcomes based on a
protected trait. In many cases, courts have dismissed disparate impact cases
because the plaintiff does not work in a large enough workplace to create the
required statistical significance or because the challenged practice does not
impact enough people to create the required level of statistical significance. 175
171

See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56
ALA. L. REv. 741, 745-46 (2005); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322-25 (1987);
Ann C. McGinley, jViva La Evoluci6n!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 415, 418-19 (2000). The author is not expressing any opinion
on whether unconscious bias is intentional or not. Rather, this sentence is meant to contrast
unconscious discrimination with more traditional ways of conceiving intentional
discrimination as conscious.
172
Oppenheimer, supra note 86, at 900.
113 Id.
114 Id.
175

See, e.g., Danielson v. Yakima Cty., No. 10-CV-3115-TOR, 2013 WL 2639241, at
*2, *6 (E.D. Wash. June 12, 2013) (finding that an employee could not produce evidence of
statistical significance where there were only eight applicants for a position); Jones v. Bayer
Healthcare LLC., No. C 03-05531 JSW, 2007 WL 879020, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2007)
(dismissing case where an employee's department was found to be too small to constitute a
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Thus, the disparate impact cause of action is only a viable option in a limited
number of factual circumstances.
Seeing Title VII's second provision as a disparate treatment provision or as
a hybrid disparate treatment/disparate impact provision necessarily leads to the
following practical questions: Can an employee prove a nonintentional
discrimination claim without proceeding through the current, onerous disparate
impact standard? Is there a way of showing that an employer limited an
employee's opportunities without relying on statistics? If so, what would the
contours of such a claim be?
To be sure, courts may still be unwilling to recognize these claims, even
with the broader framing. However, the framing itself is less of an obstacle
under the spectrum approach than it is under the dichotomy approach. This
more open framing also invites courts to think about claims that stem from
multiple sources. For example, imagine a company with a mostly male
workforce that uses a "tap on the shoulder" promotion process. Over the past
twenty years, this process has resulted in men being disproportionally selected
for promotions. A female employee also has a supervisor that makes sexist
remarks and downgrades her work for no reason. The female employee does
not apply for a promotion because she never hears of the opportunity and
because she thinks her boss will not support her. This set of facts raises two
ways of thinking about discrimination: intentional and structural. There is
currently no model in discrimination law that combines these ideas and allows
them both to be applied at the same time to the same set of facts.
Under the current framework, it is likely that this case would be dismissed.
The sexist comments may not reach the level of being severe or pervasive. The
downgrading of the employee's work may not reach the level of an adverse
employment action. The employee may not be able to make the required
statistical case to show that the tap on the shoulder promotion process created a
disparate impact. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable that a jury, if presented with
these facts, could find that the employee's sex played a role in limiting her job
opportunities.
Justice Kennedy's reading of Title VII suggests that disparate impact and
disparate treatment are much closer than previously perceived-so close that
they are part of the same textual provision. This new way of thinking about
Title VII opens the possibility for hybrid proof structures that combine
elements of existing structures.

group of statistical significance), ajf'd, 302 F. App'x 590 (9th Cir. 2008); Spence v. City of
Phila., No. Civ.A.03-CV-3051, 2004 WL 1576631, at *8-10 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2004) (finding
that a pool of sixteen applicants was too small to be statistically significant), ajf'd, 147 F.
App'x 289 (3d Cir. 2005).
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New Analysis ofIntent and Causation

Courts have long assumed that an employee proceeding on a disparate
treatment claim must prove some form of intent. 176 These statements have been
more reflexive than reasoned. But the Inclusive Communities opinion provides
a new opportunity to explore the lack of textual and other support for such a
claim. Even though the Supreme Court has often stated that disparate treatment
claims require proof of intent, 177 the Court has never done a textual analysis of
Title VII to determine whether the text justifies this conclusion.
Under the old view of discrimination law, Title VII's first provision was
denominated the "intentional discrimination" provision by default. In Griggs,
when the Supreme Court denominated the second provision as the "effectsbased" or disparate impact provision, 178 Title VII' s first provision became the
intentional discrimination provision by default. Recall that the Supreme Court
decided Griggs prior to the modem emphasis on textualism. If the Court reexamined the text of Title VII, it would find that this idea is not on sound
textual footing. The first provision of Title VII does not use the word "intent"
or even any similar words to intent, such as mens rea or recklessness. 179
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has interpreted the "because of'
language within both the ADEA and Title VII's retaliation provision to relate
to causation. 180 Given that the "because of' language refers to causation, it is
difficult to understand how the Supreme Court can textually claim that Title
VII requires proof of intent. The textual case is even weaker if the second
provision is both a disparate treatment provision and a disparate impact
provision, as Justice Kennedy reasons. Under the second provision, an
employer cannot "limit" employees or applicants "in any way that would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities ...
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 181
None of these words point to intent as it is currently understood in
discrimination cases.
One common textual device is to look up the meaning of words in a
dictionary. The word "limit" means something that "bounds, constrains, or
confines." 182 Reading the second provision as a whole, any employer practice
176 See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009); Grano v. Dep't of Dev. of
City of Columbus, 637 F.2d 1073, 1081-82 (6th Cir. 1980).
177 See, e.g., Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577.
178
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
179 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2012).
180 See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525-26 (2013);
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) ("(T]he ordinary meaning of the
ADEA's requirement that an employer took adverse action 'because of age is that age was
the 'reason' that the employer decided to act.").
18 1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
182
Limit,
MERRJAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/limit
[https://perma.cc/EMV5-TQ8H] (last visited July 10, 2016).
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that constrains or confines an employee's employment opportunities, or even
tends to do so, is prohibited if such constraint is because of a protected trait.
Thus, this provision only requires that race, sex, or other protected traits
negatively impact the employee's employment.
An example is helpful. Let's say that a manager hires ten employees within
the course of a month. He hires them all for the same entry-level position, and
they all possess the same level of skills and experiences. The manager pays the
women $9 an hour and the men $10 an hour. One of the women sues the
employer for sex discrimination. At his deposition, the manager testifies that
he has no idea why he decided to pay the women less than the men. Under the
current framework, the woman's case might not make it past summary
judgment. She cannot proceed on a disparate impact claim because ten
employees do not make a statistically significant sample for a disparate impact
analysis. A judge may find that she cannot proceed on a disparate treatment
claim because she cannot show that the manager intended to take her sex into
account. However, if we ask a jury whether the employee would have been
paid $10 an hour if she were a man, it is easy to imagine the jury finding
discrimination on the part of the employer. The manager's thoughtless
practices were just as detrimental to the employee's pay as intentional conduct
would have been. Men made more money; women made less. Under the new
framing, the key inquiry becomes whether the protected trait made a difference
in the outcome.
Justice Kennedy's reading of the second provision also strongly suggests
that the words "because of' do not indicate intent. Because Justice Kennedy
sees the second claim as containing both disparate impact and disparate
treatment provisions, it would be nonsensical to read the words "because of' as
being words of intent (as that word is traditionally used in discrimination
cases). To read those words as requiring intent would nullify any disparate
impact language within the provision. The federal courts have long clung to the
idea that most Title VII cases require intent, despite the lack of textual
evidence of an intent requirement. Even if courts continue to assert that
employees must prove intent to prove disparate treatment, Justice Kennedy's
new reading of the second provision invites new scrutiny of the meaning of
intent.
Many scholars have argued for a broader definition of the concept of intent
under the discrimination statutes. 183 If the language in Title VIl's second
provision is about disparate treatment, then courts will need to rethink whether
their current discussions about the role of intent in discrimination cases have
fully captured all of Title VII's operative language. Any notions of intent
developed by courts to date have by default only encapsulated Title Vll's first
provision because that is the only provision most courts understood as
involving intentional discrimination.
E.g., Michael Selmi, Statistical Inequality and Intentional
Discrimination, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 201 (2016).
183

(Not Implicit)
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Similarly, the second provision invites a new understanding of cat's paw
cases. Within the category of intentional discrimination, courts have used the
term "cat's paw" to describe cases in which one individual acts with a
discriminatory motive, but another individual makes the decision to take the
employment action against the individual. 184 Although the exact contours of
the cat's paw theory have not been worked out, these cases often involve a
biased supervisor or coworker who provides false information to a decision
maker, and the decision maker then makes a negative decision based on the
false information. The Supreme Court has identified cat's paw cases as being
those cases that arise when the official who takes an action has "no
discriminatory animus but is influenced by previous company action that is the
product of a like animus in someone else." 185
The Supreme Court has only decided cat's paw liability where a supervisor
acted with bias. 186 An employer is liable under a cat's paw theory when a
supervisor performs an act motivated by animus that "is intended by the
supervisor to cause an adverse employment action ... if that act is a proximate
cause of the ultimate employment action .... " 187
Given that the second provision is not concerned with specific employment
decisions, but rather the broader employment opportunities of employees, it
seems unlikely that the strictures of the current cat's paw doctrine should apply
to cat's paw cases brought under Title VII' s second provision. An employee
should be able to argue that the biased person's comments or conduct limited
her work opportunities in some way.
Further, viewing the second provision as a disparate treatment provision
should help expand notions of corporate intent. Title VII is an interesting
statute because it only creates liability for the employer and not for any
individuals who engage in intentional discrimination. 188 However, in recent
decades, courts have largely focused on the role that particular individuals play
in causing certain outcomes. They describe intent in terms of individuals. 189
Courts have not focused heavily on the company's own direct liability for
creating the environments in which the discriminatory decisions are allowed to

184 The term "cat's paw" refers to a fable in which a monkey convinces a cat to pull
chestnuts from a fire. The cat burns its paws trying to obtain the chestnuts and the monkey
eats all of them. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 415 n.1 (2011).
185
Id. at 417.
186
Id. at 420-21.
187
Id. at 422 (citation omitted). Even though Staub was a case involving the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (the "USERRA"), id. at 416,
courts have applied it in the Title VII context. See, e.g., Goodsite v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 957
F. Supp. 2d 888, 897 (N.D. Ohio 2013); Rajaravivarma v. Bd. of Trs. for the Conn. State
Univ. Sys., 862 F. Supp. 2d 127, 149-50 (D. Conn. 2012) (explaining that there is "no
reason why Staub's holding should be limited to the USERRA context").
188 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
189
See, e.g., supra note 81.
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happen and on what a corporate intent doctrine would entail in a modern
workplace.
The second provision of Title VII invites another look into the idea of
corporate intent for several reasons. The provision's focus on employment
opportunities points more to the overall trajectory of an employee's career with
an employer, rather than on specific decisions, like hiring or firing, by specific
people. 19 Further, disparate impact is largely seen as a company's direct
action. Because courts have largely read the second provision as one about a
company's direct actions in the disparate impact context, it seems plausible
that the provision also speaks to the company's actions for disparate treatment
claims that arise from that same second provision.

°

C.

A Fresh Look at Structure

A new textual analysis also helps to untangle a knotty problem that has been
plaguing the lower federal courts. Given the old way of perceiving the
structure of Title VII, courts have tended to view the statute as having multiple
"claims." As described in greater detail in Part I, courts often recognize
disparate impact as a separate "claim." Courts often divide Title VII disparate
treatment claims into kinds of claims, such as single-motive claims and mixedmotive claims, each with its own proof structure or structures. Viewing
different types of discrimination as multiple claims has important
consequences for pleading and discovery. Justice Kennedy's reading of Title
VII's second provision emphasizes that thinking of different kinds of
discrimination as separate "claims" is likely incorrect.
An example of this claim mentality and its consequences is helpful. In the
1989 case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 191 the Supreme Court interpreted
Title VII as allowing mixed-motive claims. 192 In 1991, Congress amended
Title VII, adding § 2000e-2(m) to the statute. 193 That section provides that a
plaintiff may prevail on a Title VII claim by establishing that a protected trait
was a motivating factor in an employment decision. Congress also created an
affirmative defense, which, if proven, would be a partial defense to
damages. 194 Even though the text of Title VII did not use the terms "mixedmotive," courts began referring to § 2000e-2(m) as establishing a mixedmotive claim. 195 Some courts distinguished these mixed-motive claims from
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
192
Id. at241-43.
193
Civil Rights Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
194
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (describing the limitations on relief under§ 2000e-2(m)
if the defendant is able to prove that the same actions would have been taken even without
the improper consideration).
195
See, e.g., Porter v. Natsios, 414 F.3d 13, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (referring to the "mixedmotive framework" under§ 2000e-2(m)).
190
191
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what courts called the "single-motive" claim provided under the statute's main
language in § 2000e-2(a)(l). 196 This organizational structure has a host of
practical consequences. In some cases, courts refused to instruct juries using
the "motivating factor'' language if a plaintiff did not refer to § 2000e-2(m) in
her complaint. 197 In other cases, courts refused to consider cases under the
"motivating factor" standard if the plaintiff failed to make a mixed-motive
argument at summary judgment.198
More importantly, the circuit courts have not been able to consistently
resolve the interplay between the McDonnell Douglas test and language in
§ 2000e-2(m). Many circuits have asserted that single-motive claims and
mixed-motive claims are distinct and require separate proof structures. 199 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals created a hybrid structure that combines
McDonnell Douglas and motivating factor language. 200 This means that
litigants and courts use different proof structures for proving discrimination
claims depending on the circuit in which the case is heard.
In 2013, the Supreme Court decided University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar. 201 Buried within the opinion are two sentences that
point to a different understanding of the structure of Title VII. The Supreme
Court noted: "For one thing, § 2000e-2(m) is not itself a substantive bar on
discrimination. Rather, it is a rule that establishes the causation standard for
proving a violation defined elsewhere in Title VII."202 These sentences mean
that there is no such thing as a mixed-motive claim or a single-motive claim.
Courts and litigants are entitled to use the "motivating factor" definition of
causation found in § 2000e-2(m) for all intentional discrimination claims.
Justice Kennedy's new reading of Title VII provides further support for this
idea. Justice Kennedy interprets Title VII' s second provision as both a
disparate treatment and disparate impact provision. It would be very odd
indeed if Title VII had three disparate treatment claims: one found in the first
provision, another found in the second provision, and yet a third found later in
§ 2000e-2(m). The only way to avoid this contorted reading is to read the
statute as the Court did in Nassar: Title VII's first two provisions are the core

196

Id.

See EEOC v. Aldi, Inc., Civ. No. 06-01210, 2009 WL 3183077, at *12 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 30, 2009).
198
Ginger v. District of Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining that
the plaintiffs "might have had a compelling case" if they brought a mixed-motive claim
rather than just a single-motive claim); see also Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d
100, 105 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005) (refusing to consider a motivating-factor test on appeal).
199 See, e.g., Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir.
2005).
200
Taylor v. Peerless Indus. Inc., 322 F. App'x 355, 360-61 (5th Cir. 2009).
201 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525-28 (2013).
202
Id. at 2530.
197
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language of the statute; § 2000e-2(m) is not a separate claim; and it is a
definition of the core language. 20 3
Seeing the structure in this way should resolve many practical problems in
discrimination cases. Courts should no longer dismiss a plaintiffs mixedmotive claims if the plaintiff fails to cite § 2000e-2(m). Plaintiffs should be
able to proceed on either single-motive or mixed-motive theories of their cases
without invoking specific provisions of Title VII. While judges and litigants
will still need to craft jury instructions that reflect the facts of specific cases,
judges should not disallow certain jury instructions because of a plaintiffs
failure to invoke certain specific provisions within the discrimination statutes.
D.

Tortijication

Justice Kennedy's new framing of Title VII's text provides further evidence
to counter a recent move by the Supreme Court to claim that Title VII is a tort.
In my prior work, I have explored the tortification of discrimination law. 204
Courts and commentators often label federal discrimination statutes as torts. 205
Since the late 1980s, courts have increasingly applied tort concepts to these
statutes and that trend has picked up steam within the last decade. In a series of
recent cases, the Supreme Court has claimed that because discrimination
statutes are torts, courts can look to tort law for the specific meaning of words
within Title VII and the ADEA.206
This tortification of discrimination law is most clearly seen in Nassar. 207 In
that case, the Court held that an employee bringing a retaliation claim under
Title VII is required to establish "but for" cause. 208 The opinion partially relied
on the complex relationship between the Court's own precedents and the 1991
amendments to Title VII. It also heavily relied on the idea that the federal

203

Id.

See generally Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2014)
(examining the application of tort law concepts to federal discrimination statutes over time).
205 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417-18 (2011); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,
557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1990); DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 17 (2000). But see Robert Belton, Causation in Employment
Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE L. REv. 1235, 1242 (1988) (arguing that common law
causation principles should not be robustly applied to discrimination law); David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual
Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 66, 153 (1995)
(concluding that the common law of agency is not being applied correctly in sexual
harassment cases).
206 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524-25 (2013) (explaining
that common law causation standards are the "background against which Congress
legislated in enacting Title VII''); Gross, 557 U.S. at 176.
207
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525 (starting with basic tort principles to circumscribe the
appropriate causation standard in a Title VII action).
208
Id. at 2534.
204
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discrimination statutes are torts. Nassar invoked tort law from the beginning of
the opinion, defining the case as one involving causation and then noting that
causation inquiries most commonly arise in tort cases. 209 The majority engaged
in a lengthy discussion of causation's role in tort law, with numerous citations
to the Restatement and a torts treatise. 210 The Supreme Court held, contrary to
strong countervailing arguments, that an employee bringing a retaliation claim
under Title VII is required to prove her complaint or other protected activity
was the "but for" cause of a negative employment outcome. 211 The choice the
Court makes-"but for" cause-is largely driven by the majority opinion's
narrow view of tort law and by Gross, which also relied on tort law. 212
The idea that Title VII is a tort in any way that conveys a specific meaning
is problematic for many reasons. 213 While discrimination statutes are torts in
some general sense that they do not arise out of criminal law and are not solely
contractual, it is far from clear that these statutes are enough like traditional
torts to justify the reflexive and automatic use of tort law. Employment
discrimination statutes created large exceptions to common law ideas of at-will
employment, and strong textual arguments militate against prioritizing tort law
as source of meaning. It seems odd to graft common law understandings of
words and phrases to statutory regimes that largely reject the underlying
governing premises of the common law.
Nor is it clear that tort law's theory provides much help in resolving any of
the statutory issues in federal discrimination law, given the multi-paradigmatic
nature of tort theory. 214 Tort law generally does not have independent
descriptive power. It does not cohere around a narrow enough set of theoretical
or doctrinal concepts to provide an answer or even a small subset of answers to
many statutory questions. While tort theory provides a rich history and
language for discussing competing aims, it does not often provide clear
answers to specific statutory questions. Another problem of importing tort law
into discrimination law derives from the way the Supreme Court has chosen to
frame tort law. In recent cases, the Court has often characterized tort law as
possessing narrow conceptions of causation and harm. 215 Using this narrow tort

Id. at 2522.
Id. at 2524-26 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 & cmt. b (2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 432(1),
435a & cmt. a, 870 cmt. 1 (1963 and 1964); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 279 & cmt. c, 280,
431 cmt. a, 432(1) & cmt. a (1934); w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS§ 41, at 265 (5th ed. 1984)).
211 Id. at 2534.
212
See Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
213
Sperino, supra note 204, at 1052. The notion that modem statutes derive from the
common law has been questioned for over 100 years. See Roscoe Pound, Common Law and
Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 384 (1908).
214
Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 435-36 (2011).
215
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525; Gross, 557 U.S. at 176.
209
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framework leads to discrimination law that is primarily concerned with
individual remedies, rather than a broader response to societal discrimination.
It is the language of Title VII that provides the most compelling argument
against tortification. Title VII's main operative language does not contain any
words that are uniquely tort terms of art. The main operative provisions of
Title VII do not use the words intent, factual cause, proximate cause, or
damages, which are key words used in tort causes of action. 216 Congress has
used these terms of art in certain instances and thus knows how to specifically
invoke principles like proximate cause. 217 Even the words "because of' are, at
best, an ambiguous reference to tort law; tort causes of action typically do not
define causation inquiries using the term "because of."218
And, it is the textualism argument where Justice Kennedy's new
understanding of the structure of Title VII adds further evidence to the idea
that Title VII is not a tort. Justice Kennedy states that Title VII's second
provision is about both disparate impact and disparate treatment. 219 Both of
these ideas are expressed within one statutory provision. There was no existing
traditional common law tort in 1964 that represented such a hybrid. Indeed, the
very structure of tort law (and the way that it is traditionally taught in law
schools) resists this hybridization. There is no traditional tort that uses
language like the language in Title VII's second provision, and the second
provision does not use any core concepts from tort law. While there are very

216
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (describing unlawful employment practices
without using any common law terms of art). Further, there are numerous instances where
Congress could have easily chosen language to mimic traditional tort law, but chose not to
do so. In 1991, when Congress amended Title VU to make it clear that plaintiffs are not
initially required to establish "but for" causation, Congress chose to define the plaintiff's
burden as establishing that the protected trait played a "motivating factor" in the
employment decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (making it unlawful for a protected trait to be
used as a "motivating factor for any employment practice"). This motivating factor language
is different from the substantial factor language used at the common law. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Fishkind, 51 A.3d 743, 759 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012).
217
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(l) (2012) (providing that plaintiffs may recover
damages in excess of the statutory cap if they make a showing of proximate cause); Act of
June 5, 1924, ch. 261, § 2, 43 Stat. 389, 389 (defining an injury to include "any disease
proximately caused" by federal employment); Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 105, § 306, 40 Stat.
398, 407 (stating that the United States is liable to a member of the Armed Forces for a postdischarge disability that "proximately result[ed] from [a pre-discharge] injury"); Act of
Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 458, § 1, 39 Stat. 742-43 (stating that the United States is not liable to
injured employees whose "intoxication ... is the proximate cause ofthe[ir] injury").
218
See, e.g., Taylor, 51 A.3d at 759 (reciting the elements of negligence as "l) that the
defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, 2) that the defendant
breached that duty, 3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and 4) that the loss or
injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of the duty").
219
Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2519 (2015).
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strong textual arguments that Title VII's first provision is not a tort, these
arguments grow even stronger with the second provision. The second provision
does not look like anything found within the Restatements of Torts.
Even Justice Thomas's interpretation of Title VII in Inclusive Communities
contributes to the idea that Title VII is not an intentional tort. Justice Thomas
perceived of Title VII as requiring some form of intent. 220 Yet, the second
provision of Title VII does not contain any word or words that were used at the
common law to signify intent. In a prior opinion, Justice Thomas already
characterized the words "because of' as being words of causation. 221 In the
common law of torts, these two concepts are described through different
words.
E.

A New or Different McDonnell Douglas Test

The Inclusive Communities decision also should lead courts and litigants to
argue about the contours and possibility of the continued existence of the
McDonnell Douglas test. This test has since become one of the key analytical
devices judges use to evaluate intentional discrimination cases. Critics have
argued that the test is problematic for many different reasons. The Inclusive
Communities case provides two new reasons for criticism: the test does not
incorporate elements of Title VIl's second provision, and the test unnecessarily
isolates "intentional" discrimination claims from other claims.
There are three main criticisms of the McDonnell Douglas test: (1) it is
confusing and difficult to apply; (2) it does not have a supportable connection
to the text of Title VII; and (3) it is inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The three-part burden-shifting structure of McDonnell Douglas is
atypical. In its second step, the test oddly splits the plaintiffs burden of
persuasion from the burden of production, and the defendant carries the burden
of production only. In the third step, that burden of production reverts back to
the plaintiff if the employer is able to carry its minimal responsibility of
articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action
at issue in the case. 222 Understandably, both courts and litigants have struggled
to understand and apply the test. Some members of the Supreme Court have
noted that "[l]ower courts long have had difficulty applying McDonnell
Douglas." 223 Judge Wood of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in a
concurring opinion joined by Judges Tinder and Hamilton, called attention to
"the snarls and knots" that McDonnell Douglas inflicts on courts and
litigants. 224 She derided the test as "an allemande worthy of the 16th
220

Id. at 2526-27 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
222 See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
223 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 291 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
224 Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring) ("The
original McDonnell Douglas decision was designed to clarify and to simplify the plaintiffs
task ... unfortunately, both of those goals have gone by the wayside.").
221
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century."225 Judge Tymkovich of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has
argued that the test creates confusion and that it distracts courts away from the
ultimate inquiry of whether discrimination occurred. 226 One commentator
described the test as having "befuddled most of those who have attempted to
master it," 227 and calls the burden-shifting framework "complex" and
"somewhat Byzantine. "228
This confusion is likely engendered, at least in part, from the fact that
McDonnell Douglas is not derived directly from the text of Title VII. 229 This is
not surprising because the Supreme Court decided the case in 1973, before the
full rise of textualism as an interpretative methodology. 230 The confusion has
only grown since 1991.231 In that year, Congress amended Title VII to clarify
that a plaintiff may prevail on a Title VII discrimination claim if she
establishes that a protected trait was a motivating factor in an employment
decision. 232 The language used by Congress in the 1991 amendments does not
22s

Id.

Timothy M. Tymkovich, The Problem with Pretext, 85 DENY. U. L. REV. 503, 521-22
(2008).
227
Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and
Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 859 (2004).
228
Id. at 862.
229
See Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 740 (8th Cir. 2004) (Magnuson, J.,
concurring) ("Absent from [McDonnell Douglas] was any justification or authority for this
scheme.").
230
The test is best characterized as a use of the Supreme Court's supervisory authority,
rather than an exercise of statutory interpretation. Sandra F. Sperino, Flying Without a
Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell Douglas Is Not Justified by Any Statutory Construction
Methodology, 43 Hous. L. REv. 743, 746, 765-74 (2006) (discussing McDonnell Douglas in
light of the Court's supervisory power and possible textualist arguments).
231 William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 Hous. L. REV.
1549, 1551-52 (2005); William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1972-2003: May You Rest
in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 212 (2003); William R. Corbett, Of Babies,
Bathwater, and Throwing Out Proof Structures: It Is Not Time to Jettison McDonnell
Douglas, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. PoL'Y J. 361, 364 (1998); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1226 (1995) (describing Title VII as
being theoretically incoherent and unworkable); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet:
Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2312-13 (1995); Stephen W.
Smith, Title VII's National Anthem: ls There a Prima Facie Case for the Prima Facie
Case?, 12 LAB. L. 371, 372-81 (1997); Sperino, supra note 230, at 762-90 (arguing that
McDonnell Douglas was not supported by the language of Title VII and thus lacks a proper
statutory foundation); Jeffrey A Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!": An Essay on
the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case
After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 76
(2003).
232
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012)).
226
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mimic the three-part burden-shifting structure of McDonnell Douglas. 233 Even
though it has been more than twenty years since the 1991 amendments, there
has been no satisfactory agreement regarding how the McDonnell Douglas test
intersects with the mixed-motive rubric. Some courts treat McDonnell Douglas
as the primary way to evaluate single-motive discrimination claims, while
others have tried to integrate McDonnell Douglas and the 1991 amendments
into one comprehensive test.23 4
Over the past several decades, courts have limited the procedural junctures
at which they will use the McDonnell Douglas test. The Supreme Court held a
plaintiff is not required to plead the elements of McDonnell Douglas to
withstand a motion to dismiss. 235 The test should not be used to review jury
verdicts. 236 In some circuits, it is improper for judges to instruct juries using
the three-part framework. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that
the shifting burdens of production "are beyond the function and expertise of
the jury" and are "overly complex."237 Thus, in some circuits, the primary
procedural juncture at which courts use McDonnell Douglas is the summary
judgment stage. Unfortunately, courts have not reconciled how the use of
McDonnell Douglas at the summary stage alone is consistent with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.238
The Inclusive Communities decision adds further ammunition to the
argument that McDonnell Douglas is problematic. Under both Justice
Kennedy's and Justice Thomas's new reading, Title VII's second provision is
no longer solely a disparate impact provision. If the second provision instead
speaks to intentional discrimination claims, then McDonnell Douglas should
incorporate ideas from the second provision.
As discussed in Part I, courts often interpret the McDonnell Douglas test as
requiring an employee to prove that she suffered an adverse action. The second
provision's broader coverage would eliminate this element from the
McDonnell Douglas test. The McDonnell Douglas test also relies on the idea
that cases involving circumstantial evidence of discrimination should be

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
Two sentences in the Supreme Court's decision in Nassar clarify the relationship
between different portions of Title VII. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct.
2517, 2530 (2013) ("For one thing, § 2000e-2(m) is not itself a substantive bar on
discrimination. Rather, it is a rule that establishes the causation standard for proving a
violation defined elsewhere in Title VII.").
235 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002).
236 U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-14 (1983).
237
Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1137 (4th Cir. 1988); see
also Sanders v. N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 758 (2d Cir. 2004); Kanida v.
Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 2004); Sanghvi v. City of Claremont,
328 F.3d 532, 540 (9th Cir. 2003); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317,
1322 (I Ith Cir. 1999).
238 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
233
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evaluated differently than cases involving direct evidence. While this
dichotomy has always been suspect, Inclusive Communities provides another
opportunity to reconsider whether the test is necessary or whether the statutory
language itself expresses the proper ways of questioning whether
discrimination exists.
Another idea found in Title VII's second provision is also missing from the
McDonnell Douglas formulation. The main inquiry under McDonnell Douglas
is whether the employer's reason for an action is pretext. 239 However, Title
VII's second provision combines both disparate treatment and disparate
impact, suggesting the two are more closely related than currently thought. 240
The McDonnell Douglas test unnecessarily isolates "intentional"
discrimination claims from other ideas about what constitutes discrimination.
There is an interesting connection between Inclusive Communities and
another recent Supreme Court case, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 241 In
Young, the Court held that an employee could proceed on an intentional
discrimination claim if her employer accommodated some employees who
were not able to work but refused to accommodate pregnant employees.242 In
doing so, the Court issued a bizarre version of the McDonnell Douglas test.
This new version of the McDonnell Douglas test requires the plaintiff to make
a prima facie case: "that she belongs to the protected class, that she sought
accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the
employer did accommodate others 'similar in their ability or inability to
work. '"243 The employer must then present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its decision. 244 However, this reason cannot be that it is more
expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to the category. 245 The
plaintiff can then rebut the employer's showing by "providing sufficient
evidence that the employer's policies impose a significant burden on pregnant
workers, and that the employer's ... reasons are not sufficiently strong to
justify the burden, but rather . . . give rise to an inference of intentional
discrimination. "246
This new test is very different from the traditional three-part, burdenshifting test. First, it appears that the lower federal courts play some role in
scrutinizing the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. For example,
let's say an employer has a policy that it only accommodates employees with a
239

See supra Section LB.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2012).
241
135 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2015).
242
Id. at 1344 (framing the issue as whether the "employer's policy treats pregnant
workers less favorably than it treats nonpregnant workers similar in their ability or inability
to work").
243
Id. at 1354.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
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disability and employees with on-the-job injuries because other laws require
the employer to make these accommodations. It also accommodates employees
who are injured at company softball games. This is a facially neutral policy.
Yet, the majority opinion seems to require an inquiry into why pregnant
women are not also included, and whether expense or convenience plays a
role. 247 What this inquiry is and how it would happen are left unexplored. The
new test also changes the pretext inquiry in the third step. While the Young
majority focused on intentional discrimination, its inquiry into burdens and the
employer's reasons for acting looks more like the kind of inquiry we would see
in a disparate impact case. The Court noted that if an employee established
"that the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers
while failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers," this
might be intentional discrimination.248
The Young decision expresses two ideas that may gain momentum outside
the pregnancy discrimination context if litigants and courts consider them in
light of Inclusive Communities. The first idea is that the McDonnell Douglas
test can and should be radically changed to allow for new ideas of
discrimination. The second is that the McDonnell Douglas test can incorporate
ideas of both intentional and nonintentional discrimination.
CONCLUSION

It is rare after a statute is on the books for more than fifty years to find a
new statutory provision. Justice Kennedy's interpretation of Title VII's second
provision in the Inclusive Communities decision suggests just that. Title VII
has two disparate treatment provisions, one of which has rarely been invoked
outside of a limited context.
Justice Kennedy's view of Title VII's core operative language opens a new
era of statutory exploration for federal employment discrimination law. While
this Article begins the conversation about what Title Vll's second provision
means, it also serves as an open invitation to litigants, courts, and scholars to
imagine the full theoretical and practical possibilities for Title VII's second
provision.

247 Id. (requiring the employer to justify its refusal to accommodate after the plaintiff has
made a prima facie case).
248 Id.

